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Abstract
Political coalition formation games can describe the formation and dissolution of nations, as well as the creation of coalition governments, the establishment of political parties, and other similar phenomena. These games have been
studied from a theoretical perspective, but the resulting models have not been
used extensively in empirical work. This paper presents a method of estimating political coalition formation models with many-player coalitions, and then
illustrates this method by estimating structural coeﬃcients that describe the
behaviour of municipalities during a recent set of municipal mergers in Japan.
The method enables counterfactual analysis, which in the Japanese case shows
that the national government could increase welfare via a counter-intuitive policy involving transfers to richer municipalities conditional on their participation
in a merger.
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1 Introduction
Issues related to political coalition formation have recently attracted considerable
interest from theorists and policy makers. For example, the formation and dissolution of countries can be seen as a political coalition formation game, with coalitions
consisting of residents of a geographic area [Alesina and Spolaore, 1997]. The question of how many countries ought to exist and where borders should be drawn has
current relevance in places such as Georgia or Sudan, and recent episodes such as
the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be explained using a coalition formation framework
[Desmet, Breton, Ortuno-Ortin, and Weber, 2009]. The formation of a government
also corresponds to a political coalition formation game, with the political parties
being the players. Similarly, parties could themselves be viewed as resulting from an
underlying political coalition formation game, this time with individual legislators as
the players [Merlo, 2006].
Changes to the rules governing the coalition formation game may lead to a diﬀerent
and more eﬃcient coalition structure. Any analysis of the eﬀect of such changes
requires knowledge of the underlying structural parameters and an understanding
of the process of coalition formation given various possible sets of rules.1 In order
to evaluate diﬀerent potential rules it is ﬁrst necessary to develop a model of the
behaviour of the players participating in the coalition formation game. This model
can then be used to predict the changes in behaviour that would result from the
imposition of diﬀerent sets of rules.
Although models of coalition formation date back at least to von Neumann and
Morgenstern [1944], relatively few empirical papers have made use of such models,
and these papers have tended not to examine the eﬀect of possible changes in the
rules of the coalition formation game being studied.2 Desirable properties of some
speciﬁc forms of coalition formation games, such as two-sided matching games, have
led to extensive empirical study of those game forms [Roth, 2008], but empirical
research on more general coalition formation models has been hampered by the fact
1

For example, a recurring proposal in Canada is that members of parliament should be required
to stand for a by-election if changing their party aﬃliation between general elections. Had this rule
been in place during recent parliaments, diﬀerent coalition structures might have resulted, leading
to diﬀerent governments and policy outcomes. Similarly, diﬀerent laws regarding how municipalities
can cooperate to provide public goods, or how farmers can establish agricultural cooperatives, could
lead to diﬀerent coalition structures with diﬀerent welfare implications.
2
Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo [2003] is an interesting exception.
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that neither existence nor uniqueness of a stable coalition structure is guaranteed,
and the number of coalition structures increases exponentially with the number of
players. Recently, Fox [2008] and related papers have studied coalition formation
games with transferrable utility, which is particularly relevant for issues in industrial
organization. This paper studies games where transfers are not possible, the case
which is more relevant for issues in political economy [Acemoglu, 2003].
This paper presents a method of estimating the structural parameters of a political
coalition formation model and then applies it to a recent set of Japanese municipal
mergers. In the Heisei Daigappei, individual Japanese municipalities could choose
what merger if any they wished to participate in, given a ﬁxed set of national government transfer policies. The parameters that determine municipal preferences over
mergers are estimated, and these estimates are then used to predict the eﬀect of alternative national government transfer policies. The Heisei mergers are particularly
attractive from a modelling perspective, as government policy led to mergers occurring only during 1999-2010, and thus the resulting coalition structure can plausibly
be treated as the outcome of a single period coalition formation game.3 Furthermore,
the mergers are of interest from a policy perspective, since due to eﬃciencies of scale
the smaller municipalities spend over ¥1,000,000 per capita per year providing the
same services that larger municipalities provide for slightly over ¥100,000, and almost all of this diﬀerence was being subsidized by the national government.4 Thus, in
addition to a new method of analyzing political coalition formation games, the paper
also contributes the speciﬁc analysis of an economically interesting case.
The methodological contribution consists of the use of simulated maximum likeli3

In general, a problem with applying political coalition formation models to observed data is that
political coalitions once formed tend to persist, and changes that do occur are often separated by
large time periods. The extremely high cost of any realignment means that the stability of existing borders does not provide much information, and it is not clear what it means for there to be
a “stable” coalition structure, if changes to this structure occur over time at a slow but constant
rate. The Japanese data used in this paper mostly avoids this problem. The ﬁscal crisis of the
1990s precipitated such signiﬁcant changes in intergovernmental transfers that in many cases the
old municipal borders were eﬀectively untenable, thus leading to a very large number of mergers
during the window when mergers were allowed. Furthermore, during the 1970-1995 period, national
policy had made municipal mergers extremely unattractive, and thus boundaries remained eﬀectively unchanged even though demographic changes were rendering these boundaries increasingly
ineﬃcient.
4
For comparisons, ¥1=1¢ is a rough but useful approximation. During the period in which
ﬁnancial data is analyzed, the USD/JPY exchange rate has varied from ¥147=$1 (Aug. ’98) to
¥80=$1 (Oct. ’10). GDP per capita has remained relatively constant at ¥4,000,000.
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hood estimation to obtain structural parameters describing players’ preferences over
coalitions when the observed coalition structure can be treated as the outcome of
a Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] hedonic coalition formation game. Two ways of
overcoming problems related to non-existence or multiplicity of stable coalition structures are considered. The ﬁrst method is to assume that all players have the same
preferences over coalitions, resulting in the existence of a unique stable coalition structure [Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988]. This is the approach used by Gordon and Knight
[2009], but replacing their method of moments estimator with a simulated maximum
likelihood estimator makes it computationally feasible to examine mergers involving
more than two players.5 However, the restriction that all players must have the same
preferences over coalitions does not work well in the Japanese case, where many local government services are provided at a single speciﬁc physical location (city hall,
library, health centre, etc.). Surveys suggest that residents of municipalities at the
geographic “edge” of a proposed merger were concerned about the distance to postmerger public facilities, while residents of more centrally located municipalities were
not. This implies an Alesina and Spolaore [1997] style model, where players’ ideal
points are distributed over a geographic policy space. The arrangement of jurisdictions is then the result of a tradeoﬀ between economies of scale in the provision of
public goods, and heterogeneity in preferences over the location of those goods.
A second strategy is thus developed, which allows players’ preferences over coalitions to diﬀer, but restricts the types of blocking coalitions that can form. This guarantees existence but not uniqueness of a stable coalition structure [Ray and Vohra,
1997], and thus estimation requires an assumption regarding which one of the set
of stable coalition structures is actually selected. The advantage of this approach,
however, is that the utility function can include interactions between individual and
coalition characteristics, and thus geographic distance to a Banks and Duggan [2005]
generalized median voter can be included.6 This provides a direct link between a
5

This is because the method of moments approach requires computing the stable coalition structure repeatedly as part of the estimation process. The computational advantage of the simulated
maximum likelihood approach, however, does not necessarily hold for all datasets: in some cases
a very large number of simulations might be required to reduce simulation bias to an acceptable
level, thereby making the method of moments approach more attractive. In the case of the Japanese
data used in this paper, SML estimates even with very few simulations (eg. R = 10) appear to give
acceptable results.
6
The distributional assumption regarding idiosyncratic preferences also diﬀers, with shocks being
i.i.d by municipality by coalition, rather than i.i.d by coalition as in the ﬁrst approach. The correlation between idiosyncratic preferences regarding a given coalition is thus 0 rather than 1; however,
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theoretically consistent model of jurisdiction formation and the estimating equation
as actually implemented.
These two strategies are then applied to Japanese municipal merger data, with the
cost of providing public services derived from existing national government estimates.
Geographical features of the data allow the set of possible coalitions to be reduced
to the point where the model is computationally tractable. The resulting parameter
estimates diﬀer depending on the estimation strategy used. Some of the coeﬃcients
estimated by restricting preferences (following Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]) have
opposite sign to what would be expected, while those estimated by relaxing the requirements for stability (following Ray and Vohra [1997]) have the expected sign and
plausible magnitudes. Monte Carlo exercises show that a majority of this diﬀerence
can be explained by the inability to include relevant variables within the restricted
preferences framework.7
In general, in non-transferable utility coalition formation games there are often
coalitions that, if formed, would increase the utility of some players by large amounts,
but these coalitions do not form because some other participants in the coalition
would end up with slightly lower utility. Thus, national government intervention
could lead to diﬀerent and better coalition structures forming. The structural parameters estimated are used to examine the eﬀects of two counterfactual policies.
First, the possibility of national government enforcement of transfers is considered,
where the national government allows decentralized negotiations over these transfers
to take place between municipalities. In this case, where the game is converted into a
transferable-utility game, the outcome depends on the bargaining power of diﬀerent
types of municipalities. While this policy increases the number mergers that occur, it
also leads to potentially very large transfers from poor municipalities to richer ones,
and the exact amount of the transfers cannot be known in advance without knowing the bargaining method by which municipalities divide the beneﬁts of a merger.
Even under the most optimistic assumptions regarding bargaining power, the poorest
municipalities end up worse oﬀ than under the original policy.
it is not clear that this is an improvement.
7
An earlier version of this paper [Weese, 2008] focused on variables that Kido and Nakamura
[2008] and other previous studies had identiﬁed as important: population, surface area, etc.. Plausible coeﬃcient estimates for those variables were obtained using the restricted preferences approach,
but it is very diﬃcult to respond to the Lucas critique while still satisfying the restricted preferences
conditions.
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Next, an alternative is considered where the national government provides an
additional ﬁnancial incentive for municipalities to participate in mergers. A sample
budget-balanced policy results in higher utility (equivalent on average to an increase
in income of 0.4%) for both poor and rich municipalities, even though incentives to
participate in mergers are only oﬀered to relatively richer municipalities. This result is
somewhat counter-intuitive as the problem the national government was attempting
to solve was the high cost of supporting small, poor municipalities. A regressive
conditional transfer – taxing everyone and transferring money to the residents of
richer municipalities that participate in mergers – is not an obvious response to this
problem. The result is consistent with theory, however, since an incentive for richer
municipalities to merge with their neighbours will lead to those neighbours beneﬁtting
from higher levels of public goods. Providing an incentive to richer municipalities
mimics the transfers that the municipalities themselves oﬀered in the transferable
utility game, but with amounts that are not as large. Thus, fewer mergers occur,
but the poorer municipalities are on average better oﬀ than in the transferable utility
case because they do not have to pay huge transfers to richer municipalities.8
The major contribution of this paper is to develop an empirical framework for the
estimation of political coalition formation models that takes into account theoretical
characteristics of solutions and allows for the analysis of counterfactual policies. In
addition to Gordon and Knight [2009], closely related papers are Brasington [1999]
and Saarimaa and Tukiainen [2010], which use the maximum likelihood estimator
from Poirier [1980] and are thus restricted to considering each pairwise merger in
isolation from other potential mergers.9 Other recent empirical political coalition
formation papers generally focus on describing patterns that are observed in political boundaries, while this paper estimates structural parameters and predicts how
counterfactual policies would change the set of boundaries forming.10 With suit8

This result is related to the theory presented by Armstrong and Vickers [2010] regarding antitrust regulation of corporate mergers; however, in the Armstrong and Vickers model, the cost of
allowing certain mergers to happen is that other, better, mergers do not occur, whereas in the model
presented below, the primary cost of having more mergers occur is the ever larger transfers to richer
municipalities that must be provided. The transferable utility case thus has “too many” mergers, at
least for some social welfare functions.
9
In models of the type used by Brasington and others, the probability that players 1 and 2 will
form a coalition is unaﬀected by the other options that 1 or 2 might have. The method presented
below and that used by Gordon and Knight appear to be the only ones that take into account that
the presence of a player 3 and an attractive {1, 3} coalition may disrupt a {1, 2} coalition that would
otherwise form.
10
Most empirical studies of political mergers thus far focus on American school districts. Miceli
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able modiﬁcations, the method used in this paper could be applied to other types of
coalition formation games, possibly in other ﬁelds as well as in political economy.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. The general estimation strategy
is presented in Section 2, including both the version imposing a restriction on the
form of players’ preferences and the version using instead a restriction on the types of
blocking coalitions. The use of this strategy in the Japanese case is then described in
Section 3, including an analysis of potential alternative national government policies
using counterfactual simulations. Section 4 concludes.

2

Theory

Notation follows that of Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez [2001]. Speciﬁcally, let N
be the set of players, and S ⊂ N a coalition of these players. Π is the set of all
possible coalition structures, where a coalition structure π ∈ Π is a set of coalitions
{S1 , . . . , SK } such that every player is in exactly one of these coalitions. Suppose
that player i ∈ N has preferences ⪯i deﬁned over the set {S ⊂ N |i ∈ S}, with ≺i
indicating a strict preference. The extension of these preferences to partitions is easy:
if π(i) is the coalition that municipality i belongs to in partition π, then π ⪯i π ′
if π(i) ⪯i π ′ (i). Let π ≺S π ′ for some coalition S if ∀i ∈ S, π ⪯i π ′ and at least
one of these preferences is strict. The observed coalition structure is treated as the
result of a pure hedonic coalition formation game, where the payoﬀ to each player
depends only on the coalition to which it belongs, and not on what other coalitions
occur. This is the game introduced by Dreze and Greenberg [1980], except without
the possibility of even within-coalition transfers. The inability to negotiate transfers
prevents some coalitions from forming:
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2}, and ui be a utility function describing the preferences
of player i over coalitions, with
u1 ({1, 2}) = u1 ({1}) + ϵ1 ,
u2 ({1, 2}) = u2 ({2}) + ϵ2 .

(1)

[1993], the earliest example yet found, examines the trade-oﬀ that Connecticut school districts faced
between eﬃciencies of scale and locally optimal education quality. Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby [2004]
use a much larger dataset, and examine the relationship between county-level heterogeneity and the
number of school districts and other local jurisdictions. While the estimates in each of these papers
imply a type of coalition formation game, they do not present an explicit coalition formation model.
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If ϵ1 > 0, ϵ2 < 0, |ϵ1 | > |ϵ2 |, then the stable coalition structure is {{1, 2}} if transfers
are possible, but {{1}, {2}} if they are prohibited.
Ideally, given a set of preferences, there would exist a unique stable partition:
First, the solution set is deﬁned using the von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]
“stable set”:
Deﬁnition 1. ΠVNM is a stable set with respect to (Π, <) for some binary operator
< if
1. ∄π, π ′ ∈ ΠVNM where π < π ′ . (Internal stability)
2. ∀π ∈
/ ΠVNM , ∃π ′ ∈ ΠVNM where π < π ′ . (External stability)
The goal is to deﬁne < in a way that is intuitively plausible yet at the same time
guarantees that the stable set exists, but this turns out not to be trivial. Consider,
for example, the following deﬁnition of <: π < π ′ if ∃S ∈ π ′ such that π ≺S π ′
and ∀S ′ ∈ (π \ π ′ ), (S ′ \ S) ∈ π ′ or is empty. Unfortunately, with this deﬁnition not
only is a stable set not guaranteed to exist, but in general it is not possible to devise
another plausible method of selecting a single partition as the solution of this type
of coalition formation game [Barberà and Gerber, 2007]. The following “roommates
problem” illustrates this point:
Example 2 (Gale and Shapley 1962). Suppose N = {1, 2, 3} and preferences are
{1, 2, 3} ≺1 {1} ≺1 {1, 3} ≺1 {1, 2},
{1, 2, 3} ≺2 {2} ≺2 {1, 2} ≺2 {2, 3},
{1, 2, 3} ≺3 {3} ≺3 {2, 3} ≺3 {1, 3}.

(2)

With these preferences, no stable partition exists.
Nevertheless, when the Japanese municipalities actually played a coalition formation game, an outcome did occur. The problem is then how to treat observed
outcomes such as this one when attempting to estimate parameters. There are at
least four ways to proceed: to move to a non-cooperative game structure, to accept
set identiﬁcation rather than point identiﬁcation, to restrict preferences, or to relax
the requirements for stability.
8

A non-cooperative game is guaranteed to provide a set of equilibrium outcomes,
but it is diﬃcult to use in this case as little information is available about the way in
which the municipalities actually negotiated, or who made what oﬀers, and so forth.
Thus, the speciﬁcation of the rules of the game would be essentially arbitrary. If
the equilibria did not depend on the rules, then the lack of information about the
negotiation process would not be important, but it is fairly easy to see that in this sort
of coalition formation game, diﬀerent rules produce diﬀerent outcomes. For example,
if there are a ﬁnite number of periods in which a proposer can propose a coalition or
coalition structure, then the probability with which various municipalities are selected
to be the proposer will change the types of proposals made and accepted. Radically
diﬀerent parameter estimates could be obtained by using diﬀerent probabilities of
having a municipality selected as proposer, and there is no information available
on what reasonable proposer weights would be, or even whether the proposer type
framework is appropriate.11
Another intriguing possibility is that of set identiﬁcation via moment inequalities,
following the framework described by Pakes [2010]. This appears attractive, as the
fact that {1, 2} is observed implies that {1} ≺1 {1, 2} and {2} ≺2 {1, 2} under a large
variety of equilibrium assumptions. However, in addition to this sort of inequality
showing that municipalities do not want to be “too small”, in order to identify a
bounded set it is also necessary to ﬁnd inequalities that show that municipalities do
not wish to be “too big”. This is more challenging than it ﬁrst appears, as it is true
that {{1}, {2}} observed implies that either {1, 2} ≺1 {1} or {1, 2} ≺2 {2}, but it
is not clear which of these hold. Designing an error structure that both rationalizes the observed mergers while at the same time allowing estimation using this sort
of “either-or” style inequalities is non-trivial, as the most obvious option requires a
distributional assumption regarding the error term, thereby eliminating a major advantage of the moment inequalities approach.12 This, combined with the Ponomareva
and Tamer critique regarding model misspeciﬁcation, are the major reasons why this
11

These critiques could also be applied to the choice of stability requirements used in the cooperative form game analyzed in this paper. Estimators based on a cooperative form game, however,
appear to be computationally simpler to implement than estimators based on a non-cooperative form
game. Thus, in the absence of reasons to choose a non-cooperative form game, the paper defaults
to the easier cooperative form game.
12
There is also the possibility of using a model that cannot rationalize all the observed mergers, but
it is not clear whether this has signiﬁcant advantages over a fully-speciﬁed model with a suﬃciently
fat-tailed error term.
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paper focuses on a maximum likelihood approach, using either restricted preferences
(“RP” from here on) or relaxed stability requirements (“RSR”).

2.1

Restricted Preferences

For the RP approach, consider the following restrictions on the form of ui , the utility
that player i derives from a coalition:
ui (S) = u(S) + αi ,
u(S) = v(XS ; θ) + ϵS ,

(3)

where v is a function of characteristics XS of S, taking parameters θ.
The econometrician observes XS and knows the functional form of v, and the
objective is to estimate the parameters θ. The error term ϵS is iid of a known distribution. The important restriction here is that if S ≺i S ′ then ∀j, S ≺j S ′ . That is,
all agents have identical preferences over coalitions.
Theorem 1 (Farrell and Scotchmer 1988). If all agents have identical preferences
over coalitions, a generically unique stable partition exists.
Proof. Exactly as given in Farrell and Scotchmer [1988], but repeated in Appendix
A because it is a proof by construction, and the algorithm will be used to construct
counterfactual partitions later on.
The restriction on the idiosyncratic error term is strong: it implies that the observed and unobserved characteristics of a coalition are enjoyed equally by all its
members. In particular, in the case of municipal mergers it rules out the possibility
that a large municipality merging with a smaller neighbour might take advantage of its
electoral power within the new amalgamated municipality in order to geographically
skew locations of new public facilities. The major beneﬁt of placing this restriction on
the error term is that it guarantees uniqueness, and thus estimation does not require
any assumption about an equilibrium selection rule.13
13

It might be possible to weaken the restrictions on the error term somewhat by instead assuming
the monotonic median voter property [Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, 2008], but the details of this
are not immediately obvious.
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Suppose that partition π0 is actually observed. The parameters θ can be estimated
via simulated maximum likelihood. The likelihood of π0 occurring is
∫
L(π0 stable |θ) =

∫

I(π0 stable |θ, ϵ)fϵ (ϵ)dϵ

ϵ

P (π0 stable |θ, ϵ0 )fϵ0 (ϵ0 )dϵ0 ,

=

(4)

ϵ0

where f is the PDF of the idiosyncratic shocks, and ϵ0 denotes the vector {ϵS |S ∈
π0 }.14 This integral can be numerically approximated by taking a set E0 of random
draws of ϵ0 and calculating
1 ∑
P (π0 stable |θ, ϵ0 ).
|E0 | ϵ ∈E
0

(5)

0

Because of the “convenient error partitioning” [Train, 1995] of the above, the probability can be expanded into a product of independent events.15 If S is the set of all
potential coalitions, as above, then
P (π0 stable |θ, ϵ0 ) =

∏

P (u(S ′ ) < max u(S)|ϵ0 , θ),
S∈perpS ′

S ′ ∈S

(6)

where perpS ′ = {S|S ∈ π0 , S ∩ S ′ ̸= ∅} is the set of “perpetrators” necessary to
14

More formally, deﬁne ϵ1 as the ϵ shocks not in ϵ0 , and note that fϵ (ϵ) = fϵ (ϵ1 , ϵ0 ) =
fϵ1 |ϵ0 (ϵ1 |ϵ0 )fϵ0 (ϵ0 ). Then rewrite as follows:
∫ ∫
L(π0 stable |θ) =
I(π0 stable |θ, ϵ1 , ϵ0 )fϵ (ϵ1 , ϵ0 )dϵ1 dϵ0
∫ϵ0 ∫ϵ1
=
I(π0 stable |θ, ϵ1 , ϵ0 )fϵ1 |ϵ0 (ϵ1 |ϵ0 )fϵ0 (ϵ0 )dϵ1 dϵ0
ϵ
ϵ
]
∫ 0 [∫1
=
I(π0 stable |θ, ϵ1 , ϵ0 )fϵ1 |ϵ0 (ϵ1 |ϵ0 )dϵ1 fϵ0 (ϵ0 )dϵ0
∫ϵ0 ϵ1
=
P (π0 stable |θ, ϵ0 )fϵ0 (ϵ0 )dϵ0 .
ϵ0

This exposition is due to Vadim Marmer.
15
That is, once the ϵ0 have been drawn, and thus the u(S) are known for S ∈ π0 , the events
u(S ′ ) > u(S) and u(S ′′ ) > u(S) are independent. This conditional independence allows conditional
probabilities to be expressed as products of the relevant independent events.
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deviate to S ′ . The likelihood function used for optimization is thus
L(π0 stable |θ) =

1 ∑ ∏
P (u(S ′ ) < max u(S)|ϵ0 , θ).
S∈perpS ′
|E0 | ϵ ∈E S ′ ∈S
0

2.2

(7)

0

Relaxed stability requirements

For the RSR approach, suppose that a less restrictive form is imposed on preferences:
ui (S) = v(Xi , XS ; θ) + ϵiS

(8)

where ϵiS are iid draws from a known distribution. Here, the utility a player derives
from a coalition can depend on interactions between the player’s characteristics and
those of the coalition, and similarly the ϵ for a given coalition can vary across players.
In this case, the existence, but not uniqueness of a stable partition can be guaranteed
so long as some restrictions are placed on the types of blocking coalitions that can
form. In particular, only two types of potential deviations will be considered when
evaluating whether a given partition is stable: reﬁnements, where a subcoalition of a
single existing coalition breaks oﬀ to form a coalition, and coarsenings, where two or
more existing coalitions merge in order to form a new coalition.
To guarantee existence, Ray and Vohra [1997] only allow deviating coalitions to
force reﬁnements of a partition, and Diamantoudi and Xue [2007] show that this
creates a stable set.16 Because hedonic games are simpler than the “equilibrium
coalition structures” that Ray and Vohra examine, reﬁnements and coarsenings will
be treated identically. Otherwise, the theory follows that presented in Ray and Vohra.
Let π ↗S π ′ and π ↘S π ′ mean that π ≺S π ′ , S ∈ π ′ , where π ′ is a coarsening and a
reﬁnement of π, respectively. Using the terminology of Ray and Vohra, π is blocked
by π ′ if either there is a set of coalitions in π that are unanimously in favour of merging
to create π ′ , or there is a subset of “perpetrators” in π that are unanimously in favour
of deviating from their current coalition. In the former case, π ′ is the coarsening that
results from the merger, while in the latter it is a reﬁnement that includes a coalition
for these perpetrators and some arrangement of the “residual” left behind when the
16

An alternative approach would be to allow only single player deviations, as in Greenberg [1979].
Ray and Vohra [1997] is used instead because anecdotal evidence suggests that multi-player deviations involving a reﬁnement or a coarsening were more common than single player deviations not to
a reﬁnement or a coarsening during the coalition formation process.
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perpetrators deviated, such that the conﬁguration of perpetrators and residual is
stable. More formally, where → should be read as “blocked by”:
Deﬁnition 2. π → π ′ if ∃S such that either π ↗S π ′ or π ↘S π ′ , where
1. π ↗S π ′ if π ′ \ π = S such that π ≺S π ′ and S =

∪

Q for some Q ⊂ π.

2. π ↘S π ′ if ∃S ∈ π ′ such that π ≺S π ′ , and
a) π \ π ′ = S ′ with S ′ =

∪

Q′ for some Q′ ⊂ π ′ , or

b) ∄Q̃ such that Q′ → Q̃.
The recursion is well deﬁned since Q′ is a proper subset of π ′ .
Theorem 2. Let ↠ be the transitive closure of →.17 Then
1. Π∗ = {π|∄π ′ such that π → π ′ } is a stable set with respect to (Π, ↠).
2. Π∗ is unique.
3. Π∗ contains a Pareto optimal partition.
Proof. Straightforward given Ray and Vohra [1997], but provided in Appendix A for
completeness.
All partitions in Π∗ , including those that are not Pareto optimal, will be treated
equally, since imposing additional restrictions at this stage would mean that the solution set would no longer be the outcome of the cooperative game coalition formation
process described above.18
Estimation of this model is similar to that of the RP model. Following the notation
introduced for RP (Section 2.1), let ϵ0 denotes the vector ϵiS , ∀i ∈ S, ∀S ∈ π0 . Suppose
that partition π0 is actually observed. If only partitions in the solution set Π∗ are
observed, and every partition in Π∗ is assumed to be selected with equal probability,
To see why the transitive closure is used here, consider the case where π1 ↗S π2 ↘S ′ π3 . π1 and
π2 should not be in the stable set, while π3 should, but {π3 } is not a VNM stable set with respect
to → because π1 ↛ π3 .
18
There may be some “solutions” that seem particularly unattractive: {π ∈ Π∗ |∃π ′ ∈ Π∗ , π ⇝ π ′ }.
While the theory above could likely be rewritten to shrink the stable set, eliminating these elements,
in the Japanese case it is unfortunately computationally infeasible to impose any restrictions that
require enumerating the entire stable set.
17
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then the parameters θ can be estimated via maximum likelihood. The likelihood of
π0 occurring is
∫

I(π0 stable |θ, ϵ)
fϵ (ϵ)dϵ
ϵ Π I(π stable |θ, ϵ)fπ dπ
∫
1
∗
= P (π0 ∈ Π |θ) ∫
fϵ (ϵ|π0 ∈ Π∗ , θ)dϵ
ϵ Π I(π stable |θ, ϵ)fπ dπ
[ ]
1
∗
= P (π0 ∈ Π |θ)Eϵ|π0 ∈Π∗ ,θ
,
Z

L(π0 |θ) =

∫

(9)

where Z is the number of stable partitions (i.e. |Π∗ |). Since the distribution of ϵ
is known by assumption, this could in theory be calculated exactly. Due to computational constraints, however, both terms in the above likelihood function will be
estimated. Assume that π0 in fact consists of π0,1 , π0,2 , ..., π0,K , the outcomes of K
independent coalition formation games. Then Z = Z1 Z2 · · · ZK , and take the Kth
root of both sides of the above equation. Then
√
K
L(π0 |θ) =

√
K

[ ]
1
P (π0 ∈ Π∗ |θ)Eϵ|π0 ∈Π∗ ,θ
Z

(10)

is a consistent M-estimator for θ. However, for computational reasons it is not possible
to calculate the above, so instead a numerical approximation of the expectation will
be used. In particular, consider the case where K → ∞. Then

and

log Z − µπ0 ,θ
√
∼ N (0, σπ0 ,θ )
K

(11)

[ ]
1
→p Eϵ|π0 ∈Π∗ ,θ
.
Eϵ|π0 ∈Π∗ ,θ [Z]
Z

(12)

Eϵ|π0 ∈Π∗ ,θ [Z] = |Π|ρπ0 ,θ ,

(13)

1

Now let
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where ρ is the fraction of partitions that are stable.19 ρ will be estimated by randomly
selecting a set of partitions ΠA and calculating the probability that they are stable.
This results in the estimator
√
1
K P (π ∈ Π∗ |θ)
0
1
|Π| |ΠA | Σπ∈ΠA P (πi ∈ Π∗ |π0 ∈ Π∗ , θ)
√
√
P (π0 ∈ Π∗ |θ)|ΠA |
= K |Π| K
.
(14)
Σπ∈ΠA P (πi ∈ Π∗ |π0 ∈ Π∗ , θ)
Since |Π| does not depend on θ, an equivalent estimator is
√
K

P (π0 ∈ Π∗ |θ)|ΠA |
.
Σπ∈ΠA P (πi ∈ Π∗ |π0 ∈ Π∗ , θ)

(15)

The actual estimation is performed via numerical approximation of the above probabilities. Speciﬁcally, if E0 is a set of draws from the distribution of ϵ0 , then the
approximation is
|ΠA |
1 ∑
P (π0 ∈ Π∗ |θ, ϵ0 ) ∑
.
∗
∗
|E0 | ϵ ∈E
π∈ΠA P (π ∈ Π |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ∈ Π )
0

(16)

0

Once again, because of the convenient error partitioning of the above, the probability
can be expanded into a product of independent events. Let S0↑ be the set of all
coalitions that could be formed by mergers of the coalitions in π0 , and let S0↓ be the
set of all coalitions that are a subset of a coalition in π0 . Then
P (π0 ∈ Π∗ |θ, ϵ0 ) =

∏

P (π0 ⊀S S|θ, ϵ0 ).

S∈(S0↑ ∪S0↓ )
19

Interchanging the expectation and reciprocal operations is valid because
1
1
E[ ] = E[ Σi=K log Zi ]
Z
e
= E[e−Σi=K
= E[e
= E[e
≃ E[e

log Zi
K

−µK+o( √K
K

K
)

√
−µK+o( K)
−µK

since µ > 1 because π0 ∈ Π∗ .
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],

]
]

]

(17)

Now approximate the denominator by deﬁning ϵl and El in the same way as ϵ0 and
E0 :
P (πl ∈ Π∗ |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ∈ Π∗ ) =

1 ∑
|El | ϵ ∈E
l

∏

P (πl ⊀S S|θ, ϵ0 , ϵl , π0 ∈ Π∗ ).

(18)

l S∈(S ↑ ∪S ↓ )
l
l

There are two problems with estimating this numerically. First, draws need to be
made from ϵl |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ∈ Π∗ , and second, given a draw of ϵl from the correct distribution, the required probability needs to be calculated eﬃciently. Fortunately, for both
cases, an application of Bayes’ Rule is suﬃcient. To draw from ϵl |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ∈ Π∗ , ﬁrst
deﬁne ϵS to be the idiosyncratic shocks to coalition S ∈ πl . If S is not a potential
deviation from π0 , then ϵS |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ∈ Π∗ = ϵS since no additional information is provided by the fact that π0 is stable. If S is a potential deviation from π0 , then consider
the identity
f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 ) = f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ⊀ S)P (π0 ⊀S S|θ, ϵ0 )
+ f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ≺S S)P (π0 ≺S S|θ, ϵ0 ).

(19)

Here f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 ) is equal to the unconditional density f (ϵS ), which is known by assumption. The second distribution on the right hand side is a set of truncated distributions
because if π0 ≺S S then it must be true that ui (S) > ui (π0 ), and thus
ϵi > ui (π0 ) − vi (S),

(20)

and these can be calculated sequentially. Thus, the desired distribution can be drawn
by simulating from
f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ⊀S S) =

f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 ) − f (ϵS |θ, ϵ0 , π0 ≺S S)P (π0 ≺S S|θ, ϵ0 )
,
P (π0 ⊀S S|θ, ϵ0 )

(21)

which can be done sequentially for each member of S.20
20

The simplest way of ensuring that π0 is always in the stable set is to draw a new ϵ for each new
proposed θ̂; however, this introduces simulation “chatter”, making convergence diﬃcult. Instead of
simulating ϵ0 directly, then, draw quantile indices qj , and create ϵj from qj fresh for each iteration
of θ̂.
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The next problem is using these drawn ϵl to calculate the probability
P (πl ⊀S S|θ, ϵ0 , ϵl , π0 ∈ Π∗ )

(22)

where S ′ is some coalition not in πl . If S ′ is not a potential deviation from π0 , then
the calculation is identical for those done for π0 , described above. However, if S ′
is a potential deviation from π0 , then the fact that π0 is stable provides additional
information that needs to be taken into account. Consider the following:
P (πl ⊀S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl ) = P (πl ⊀S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl , π0 ⊀ S ′ )P (π0 ⊀S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl )
+ P (πl ⊀S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl , π0 ≺S ′ S ′ )P (π0 ≺S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵ1 ).

(23)

Since the left hand side can be calculated and the second term of the right hand side
has the same set of truncated distributions described just above with respect to the
ϵl , rearrangement once again permits calculation:
P (πl ⊀S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl , π0 ⊀S ′ S ′ ) =

(24)

′

′

′

′

1 − P (πl ≺S ′ S |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl ) − (1 − P (πl ≺S ′ S |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl , π0 ≺S ′ S ))P (π0 ≺ S |θ, ϵ0 , ϵ1 )
.
1 − P (π0 ≺S ′ S ′ |θ, ϵ0 , ϵl )
Everything on the right hand side of this equation can be computed quickly, making
optimization feasible.

3 Application
Treating municipal mergers as a pure hedonic coalition formation problem is consistent with anecdotal evidence concerning how mergers are eﬀected. Negotiations
regarding compensation seem to be rare, even though controversy is common and
the results of unrest sometimes signiﬁcant.21 Some of the involved municipalities
may be in favour of a proposed merger while others may be opposed, but those in
favour do not seem to promise large transfers to those opposed in order to secure their
cooperation. This suggests that there is some problem with contractibility in polit21

For example, in Canada the merger of all municipalities on Montreal Island in 2002 was a major
cause of the provincial government losing the next election, and the demerger process following that
election meant that on net only limited change occurred despite signiﬁcant economic and political
costs.
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ical mergers such that transfers are diﬃcult or impossible, and thus it seems more
plausible to model mergers as a coalition formation game without transfers. First,
a model of jurisdictions with heterogeneity in individual ideal points is presented, in
the style of Greenberg and Weber [1986], Demange [1994], and in particular Alesina
and Spolaore [1997]. The Japanese data used is then described, and parameters are
estimated via the methods presented in the preceding section.

3.1

Municipal Public Goods Model

Suppose that each municipality m provides a public good of quality qm at a cost of
qm · c(Pm ), where P is population, and c exhibits economies of scale. The municipality levies taxes at rate τm and receives transfers Tm from the national government.
Population is distributed on a plane, and the public good is provided at a single
physical location xm on this plane. Suppose that there is some minimum tolerable
level of public good provision q. Individual utility will be assumed to be additively
separable:
ui (qm , τm , θm ) = β0 log((1 − τm )yi ) + β1 log(qm − q) + β2 ℓi (θm ) + ϵim

(25)

where ℓi is the distance between individual i and location of the public good, with
β2 < 0. The error term ϵ is irrelevant until the possibility of mergers is considered.
The location of the public good is a multidimensional political decision, a problem
which has no generally accepted solution concept. However, if this decision is made
by a single elected oﬃcial, such as a mayor, and voting in elections is determined via
a probabilistic voting model where vote probabilities are linear in utility diﬀerence
between two candidates, then the policy chosen will in fact be the socially optimal
policy [Banks and Duggan, 2005].22 In this case, this will set θm to the location of
the generalized median voter.
The optimal quality supplied is determined by the budget constraint τm Ym =
qm c(Pm ) − Tm , where Ym is total income of all individuals in the municipality, which
22

Prior to the merger period, mayors were responsible for delivering hundreds of “agency delegated
functions” from higher levels of government, making them bureaucrats as well as politicians, and
making it possible (at least in theory) for central ministries to ﬁre a mayor for not performing a
delegated function according to speciﬁcations. “Agency delegated functions” were abolished during
the merger period, and municipal policies are thus modeled as being determined by local residents
through a political process.
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leads to
Ym + Tm − qc(Pm )
+q
c(Pm )
Ym + Tm − qc(Pm )
∗
τm
= 1 − β0
,
Ym

∗
qm
= β1

(26)
(27)

∗
if β0 + β1 = 1. Due to the functional form assumption all individuals prefer τm
regardless of income, and thus this is the tax rate implemented.
In this model, individuals do not move or otherwise change their ideal point and
population is assumed to be constant. In reality, residence choice is endogenous
to government characteristics, as discussed in the literature established by Tiebout
[1956] and others. This endogeneity is not included in this paper for three reasons.
First, mobility is lower in Japan than in most other developed countries and a large
portion of the inter-municipality moves reported in the census appear to be temporary.
Endogenous relocation is thus less of a concern than in other countries. Second, there
is no evidence of tax competition. The majority of municipalities charge a standard
tax rate and even though municipalities are allowed to set a diﬀerent rate (within a
band), few choose to exercise this option. This is consistent with the model presented
above, and combined with the national government transfer scheme results in the
endogeneity problem being less severe than it would be in other contexts. Finally,
from an implementation perspective, endogeneity would result in future population
and other characteristics of a municipal merger depending on what other mergers
occurred in the surrounding area. This would change the nature of the coalition
formation game from a characteristic function game to a partition function game,
which is substantially more computationally intensive to estimate, and likely infeasible
without further theoretical or technological developments. Population dynamics are
thus ignored, with the estimates that follow focusing on a single period game with
player characteristics determined based on current government data sources.23
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Figure 1: Shizuoka Prefecture
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There were 3,255 municipalities in 1999 at the start of the merger period, divided into
47 prefectures (similar to U.S. states). Since mergers do not cross prefectural boundaries, each prefecture is treated as a separate coalition formation game.24 Figure 1
shows the mergers that occurred in Shizuoka Prefecture. Mergers were voluntary, and
needed to be approved by the municipal council of every participating municipality.25
23

Similar results were obtained when 2005 census data is used instead of the 1995 data currently
used. Predicted future municipal population could be created based on census data, but the similarity of results obtained with data from diﬀerent census years suggests that this exercise may not
produce particularly interesting results.
24
There is one exception, involving a single municipality switching prefectures. It is treated as
though the municipality in question was always part of the “destination” prefecture.
25
In about a third of cases, referenda were held. Nominally, these were consultative, but there
is only one instance in which a municipal council voted opposite to a referendum result. This case
was complicated due to multiple referenda with conﬂicting results as well as a number of of other
procedural irregularities, and ﬁnally resulted in a recall of the mayor and a request to the prefectural
governor to reverse the merger. The request for reversal was denied.
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The involvement of the municipal council suggests that some form of legislative bargaining model may be needed; however this paper abstracts away from this issue and
supposes that a single elected oﬃcial such as the mayor is responsible for decisionmaking. In the simpliﬁed framework presented here, these decisions will be optimal
from the perspective of municipal residents, and parameters to the utility function
given in Equation 25 can thus be estimated by examining the mergers that actually
occurred.26
The number of municipalities dropped to 1,750 in 2010, due to 598 mergers ranging
in size from two municipalities up to ﬁfteen municipalities. These mergers occurred
mainly due to changes to the rules determining transfers T . Historically, transfers
were determined by the formula
Tm = max(c̃m (Pm ) − .75τ̄ Ym , 0),

(28)

where c̃m is the estimated cost to the municipality of providing those services (referred
to as “Standard Fiscal Need” in oﬃcial documents), and τ̄ a reference tax rate set by
the national government. Here the scale for quality has been normalized such that the
“national minimum” level of quality used by the government to compute Standard
Fiscal Need is 1. Although there were provisions for municipalities to merge, there
was little incentive for them to do so, because if a coalition S decided to form a new
(amalgamated) municipality, TS would be calculated exactly as in Equation 28:
TS = max(c̃S (PS ) − .75τ̄ YS , 0).

(29)

Thus almost all savings would be passed to the national government, and even a
slight preference for smaller jurisdictions ensured that residents would be opposed to
mergers.27
During the ﬁscal diﬃculties of the early 1990s, the national government implemented a series of reforms designed to reduce the total transfers provided to municipalities while attempting to minimize the negative eﬀects of this decrease. These
reforms consisted mainly of a lump sum cut in transfers to all municipalities, making
26

The possibility of future mergers is ruled out. Given that the previous set of municipal mergers
occurred in the 1960s, experience suggests that any future mergers are likely far enough away that
a reasonable discount rate reduces their importance to the point where they can safely be ignored.
27
In general, the division of a municipality was prohibited. In one case, such a split did occur,
but both of the resulting municipalities were immediately merged with diﬀerent neighbours.
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it diﬃcult for small municipalities to maintain service quality unless they merged,
and change to Equation 29 to reduce the penalty associated with merging.
Data sources for municipal population, income per capita, etc. are described in
Appendix B. Details regarding c̃ and the changes to the transfer formula are given in
Appendix C. Further general information on the Japanese local public ﬁnance system
available from Mochida [2008]. Hayashi, Nishikawa, and Weese [2010] examine the
issues surrounding c in some detail and conclude that c̃ ≃ c: that is, the national
government estimates accurately reﬂect the actual eﬃciencies of scale in the provision
of public services.28 These eﬃciencies of scale are substantial, as shown in Figure 2
(see Appendix C for details).
A ﬁnal interesting feature of municipal ﬁnance in Japan is that there is little
variation in tax rates charged by municipalities: despite the fact that local governments have the authority to choose any rate within a band established by the national
government, almost all charge τm = τ̄ . One possible explanation is political: munic∗
ipalities charge τ̄ even though τ̄ > τm
for most m because of pressure from higher
levels of government or the risk of negative publicity. This is unsatisfying in that
it suggests that a much more complicated model, one involving political processes
about which little is known, is necessary in order to explain the observed municipal
tax system. Another possibility is to set q = 1, that is, to make the oﬃcial national
minimum standard the boundary between intolerably low and acceptable levels of
public services for individuals. This is also unsatisfying in that it implies that any
level of government service below the national minimum would result in inﬁnite disutility; however, it has the major advantage that Equation 27 reduces to
∗
τm
= 1 − β0 (1 − .75τ̄ )

for municipalities that are receiving transfers, using Equation 28 and the assumption
1−τ̄
∗
= τ̄ if β0 = 1−.75τ̄
that c̃m = cm . Therefore, τm
, which is about 0.97 when τ̄ = 0.12,
28
To brieﬂy summarize Hayashi et al. [2010], over-representation of rural areas within the Japanese
Diet means that the risk is that government estimates overstate eﬃciencies of scale, rather than
understating them. If the true eﬃciencies of scale were lower than the government estimates shown
in Figure 2, then smaller municipalities were receiving rents. If such rents existed, then either they
were distributed to residents, which should be visible in land prices, or they were captured by a group
of political insiders, which should result in rural political leaders being more opposed to municipal
mergers than their constituents; however, neither of these phenomena are observed.
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the observed average tax rate. Although this value for β0 is higher than the estimated
value discussed later (β̂0 = 0.91), bootstrap analysis suggests that the null hypothesis
1−τ̄
that β0 = 1−.75τ̄
should not be rejected. The assumption that q = 1 will thus be used
both for estimation and the analysis of counterfactual policies.

3.3

Estimation

Consider Equation 25, but simplify and replace municipality m with coalition S:
ui (qS , τS , θS ) = β0 log(1 − τS ) + β1 log(qS − q) + β2 ℓi (θS ) + ϵiS .
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(30)

The local politician is assumed to choose the social optimum, as discussed above. As
there is no private information, the choice of qS∗ , τS∗ , and θS∗ can be predicted for any
coalition S. Thus, with some abuse of notation, the preferences for the politician
from municipality m can be described by
∑
um (S) = β0 log(1 −

τS∗ )

+

β1 log(qS∗

− q) + β2

∗
i∈m ℓi (θS )

Pm

+ ϵmS ,

(31)

∑
where ϵmS = P1m i∈m ϵiS and might plausibly be normally distributed due to the
Central Limit Theorem. For technical reasons, however, the assumption will be that
ϵmS is drawn from an Extreme Value Type II distribution.29
For estimation via the RP method, the restriction ϵmS = ϵm′ S = ϵS is also required.
∑
Furthermore, the distance term P1m i∈m ℓi (θS∗ ) cannot be used as is with this method,
as it diﬀers between members of the same coalition S. Thus, for the RP approach,
ℓ̄, the mean distance over all individuals in the coalition S, will be used in place
of the actual ℓi values for individuals within each municipality. This is equivalent
to assuming that all individuals within S will be randomly reassigned a diﬀerent
individual’s ideal point after S forms, which is not plausible. This necessary but
undesirable assumption will bias both the estimate of β2 and other parameters, as
discussed in the following section. The RSR method allows arbitrary utility functions,
and thus the distance term can be used as given in Equation 31.
The determination of S , the set of potential alternative mergers that need to
be checked during estimation, is slightly more problematic. There are a number of
large mergers observed, with the largest involving ﬁfteen municipalities. Almost all
observed mergers are geographically contiguous. However, even after restricting S
to contiguous coalitions of size ﬁfteen or less, there are still over 1016 possibilities,
which is computationally infeasible.30 Most of these coalitions, however, look very
29

Speciﬁcally, if ϵ is drawn from an EV Type II (“Frechet”) distribution, then the log probability
that S ≺m S ′ given ϵmS simpliﬁes to −(vmS ′ − umS )−α , where α is a shape parameter and v is the
non-idiosyncratic part of u. This both substantially speeds calculation and helps to avoid ﬂoatingpoint underﬂow errors, which are potentially problematic when performing non-trivial calculations
on large numbers of probabilities close to both 0 and 1. The Frechet distribution may appear
undesirable because it is bounded on one side; however, preferences of m over S and S ′ depend
on the diﬀerence between ϵmS and ϵmS ′ , which is unbounded. Any observed outcome can thus be
rationalized under this distributional assumption.
30
More speciﬁcally, there are thirteen observed mergers that are not geographically contiguous,
usually because one of the participants dropped out late in the merger process. Although the law
stated that mergers were to be contiguous, these exceptions were allowed. Islands with only a single
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diﬀerent than the actually observed coalitions. In particular, they tend to be a thin
line of municipalities, stretching almost all the way across a prefecture. On average,
individuals in these coalitions would have very high distance ℓ, and the coalitions are
thus not likely to form. Including this group of “low probability” coalitions in the
calculations would be ideal. However, for computational reasons these will instead
be ruled out through the use of a restriction: coalitions will not be allowed to cross
more than two county boundaries, using county deﬁnitions from the Meiji era.31
This restriction dramatically reduces the number of large coalitions that need to be
considered: with ﬁfteen-municipality coalitions, only one coalition in a billion involves
three or fewer counties.32 This reduces the total number of alternatives that need to
be considered to about 20 million per prefecture, which is computationally feasible.
Another problem that is only relevant to the estimation via RSR is the estimation
of the size of the stable set. Since the number of partitions grows exponentially with
the number of municipalities, it is not possible to examine all partitions. The total
number of partitions is unknown but bounded above by the Bell numbers (Sloane
#A000110), which are greater than 10100 for larger prefectures such as Hokkaidō.
Therefore, a random sample is drawn instead. It is, however, non-trivial to randomly
sample from a set which is too large to be enumerated. Thus, random draws are
obtained using Markov chains, as described in Appendix D.

3.4

Results

The results are shown in Table 1, with scale determined by the restriction β0 + β1 = 1
and standard errors approximated via likelihood ratio tests. Columns I and II are
municipality on them are treated as being connected to the closest municipality on the “mainland”
(i.e. Hokkaidō, Honshū, Shikoku, or Kyūshū) if it is within 50km. There are, however, two cases in
which municipalities on an island merged with municipalities on the mainland other than the closest
one. There are also six cases where municipalities on two separate islands merged together. Thus,
about 3.5% of mergers (21/588) are not contiguous. No additional mergers violating contiguity are
generated as comparison coalitions, although the mergers did occur are retained in the observed
partitions, and may also appear in alternative partitions.
31
In particular, the county boundaries used are from 1878 for eastern Japan, and 1896 for western
Japan. Counties are statistical divisions, and have not had any political function since the 1920s.
Counties in Tokyo and Nagano Prefectures are anomalously large, and thus in those prefectures only
the restriction is to one and two counties, respectively, rather than three.
32
Two actual mergers violate the restriction on number of counties that is imposed: one size
twelve merger in Shizuoka, and one size eleven merger in Niigata. This represents 0.3% of all
observed mergers.
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Table 1: Dependent variable is um (S), utility to municipality m from merger S

CONSUMPTION (β0 )
GOVERNMENT (β1 )
DISTANCE (10 · β2 )
DISTANCE_POL
scale
shape
N (prefectures)

relaxed stability requirements
I
II
0.909
0.913
(0.074)
(0.098)
0.091
0.087
(0.002)
(0.005)
−0.086
−0.072
(0.001)
(0.003)
−0.068
(0.024)
1.955
0.210
107.569
16.281
46
46

restricted preferences
III
IV
1.014
1.020
(0.120)
(0.127)
−0.014
−0.020
(0.001)
(0.001)
−0.035
−0.039
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.015
(0.006)
0.152
0.275
9.150
14.880
40
40

estimates using the RSR approach, while columns III and IV are estimates using the
RP approach. Columns I and III use exactly the utility function discussed previously, while Columns II and IV include one additional variable: DISTANCE_POL
is the average political distance to the new median voter on a one dimensional political spectrum, using political spectrum location estimates from Kubo, Mitsuyo, and
Kishimoto [2006]. Results obtained via the RSR approach are consistent with theory:
higher private (post-tax) consumption and better government services are desirable,
while greater distance, both geographic and on the political spectrum, is undesirable.
Assuming that income and transfers per capita are identical across all municipalities, and ignoring the eﬀect of the transfer scheme on merger incentives, the ratio
of the coeﬃcients regarding geographic distance and government services in Column
I of Table 1 imply that a municipality would be willing to accept an increase in average distance between residents’ ideal points and policy location of 10km (disutility
of 0.086), in exchange for decreasing the per capita cost of providing government
services by a factor of e (utility of 0.091). From the perspective of private consumption, an individual with average income is willing to accept about ¥25,000 per year
in exchange for an increase in distance of 1km. This estimate may seem high; however, municipalities are responsible for public school facilities, and municipal mergers
are often followed by school amalgamations. For many families, travel to the public
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facilities in question occurs more days than not.
If a social planner were drawing initial borders on a featureless plane with uniform
population density equal to the average population density of Japan (about 340 per
sq. km), the optimal population size for a set of uniformly sized municipalities would
be the value of Pm that maximizes
β0 log(

√
Ym − c(Pm )
Ym − c(Pm )
) + β1 log(
) + 0.377β2 Pm /340,
Ym
c(Pm )

(32)

where 0.377 is a coeﬃcient for the average distance to the centroid based on hexagonal
packing, and Pm /340 the area in square kilometres. This gives an optimal size of
about 80,000 residents, which is below Japanese estimates of the eﬃcient size for a
municipality: The Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs’ “Standard Municipality” has a size of
100,000, and the Ministry’s target of 1,000 municipalities implies a target population
(on average) of 125,000.33 This diﬀerence may be due to the fact that the model
used in this paper does not include the ability of “designated cities” to assume some
responsibilities that would normally be handled by the prefecture. This appears to
have been one of the incentives for very large mergers, such as Niigata City (size
ﬁfteen) or Hamamatsu City (size eleven), and the model underpredicts the number
of these very large mergers.34
While the estimates obtained using the RSR approach match theoretical predictions, those obtained by the RP approach (Columns III and IV) do not. In particular,
the coeﬃcient on public services is negative, which suggests that the model is misspeciﬁed. A key diﬀerence between the RSR approach and the RP approach, as
discussed in the previous section, is that the DISTANCE variable for municipality
m in coalition S is based on the geographic distance ℓi (θS∗ ) for individuals i in municipality m in the former case, but all individuals in the entire coalition S in the
latter case. The problem with the averaging in this latter case is that it understates
the disadvantage of merging for relatively smaller municipalities, and overstates it for
relatively larger municipalities. In the extreme, if each municipality had its population at a single point, there would be no change in distance for the larger of a pair of
33

Hayashi [2002] ﬁnds that the smallest city of eﬃcient scale has a population of 120,000, based
on third-party ratings of municipal service quality.
34
Adding the possibility of moving certain public goods from the prefectural level to the municipal
level would substantially complicate the model, as it would imply that there are multiple public goods
displaying diﬀerent eﬃciencies of scale. This, combined with the fact that there are relatively few
“designated cities”, is why this feature is not included in the model.
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Table 2: Monte Carlo simulations (median estimate and 95% interval)

CONSUMPTION (β0 )

true
value
I
0.913

GOVERNMENT (β1 )

0.087

DISTANCE (10 · β2 )

−0.072

DISTANCE_POL

−0.068

scale
shape
N (pref. per rep.)
R (replications)

0.210
16.281
15
100

relaxed stability requirements
(rest. dist.)
II
III
0.908
0.970
[0.245, 0.981]
[0.820, 0.995]
0.092
0.030
[0.019, 0.755]
[0.005, 0.180]
−0.067
−0.027
[-0.497, -0.017] [-0.119, -0.011]
−0.067
−0.012
[-0.448, -0.008] [-0.088, 0.013]
0.204
0.055

restricted
preferences
IV
1.010
[1.003, 1.019]
−0.010
[-0.019, -0.003]
−0.015
[-0.033, -0.010]
−0.010
[-0.038, 0.020]
0.093

municipalities if they merged, as the location of the generalized median voter would
remain unchanged. An inaccurately low estimate of the value of government services
counteracts this eﬀect, as the change in the quality of government services is larger
for the smaller municipalities participating in a merger than for the larger ones.
Table 2 shows this eﬀect with artiﬁcial data created from the parameter values
shown in Column I, which correspond to those in Column II of Table 1, and are
based on the RSR model. Column II of Table 2 veriﬁes that these parameters can
be recovered with acceptable ﬁnite sample bias and simulation noise via the strategy
presented in this paper. Column IV of Table 2 shows that if this simulated data
is used to estimate parameters based on the RP model, a negative coeﬃcient on
government services is obtained, as in Columns III and IV of Table 1. Column III of
Table 2 shows results obtained by running the RSR model using the modiﬁed distance
data necessary to meet the restrictions of the RP model. The parameter estimates
in Column III are closer to those of Column IV than Column II, showing that the
majority of the bias in the estimates in Column IV is due to the diﬀerent deﬁnition
of distance that must be used, rather than the diﬀerent distributional assumption
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inherent in the model.35 For the counterfactual policy simulations presented below,
then, the RSR model will be treated as the correct model.
A major advantage of having coeﬃcient estimates for a structural model is the
ability to conduct counterfactual analysis. Two alternative national government policies can be examined: ﬁrst, national government enforcement of transfers negotiated
between municipalities during the coalition formation process; second, an incentive
scheme for richer municipalities that participate in mergers.

3.5

Counterfactual simulations: Transferable utility

Suppose that the central government oﬀered to enforce whatever transfers resulted
from decentralized negotiations amongst municipalities. That is, if municipality m
promised to make a certain transfer from its current residents to the current residents
of municipality m′ , the central government would ensure that this was actually carried
out. Assume that the transfers negotiated are “small”, in the sense that a linear
approximation of utility around transfers of zero is reasonable:
∑
um (S, z) = β0 log((1 − τS )ym +
≃ β0 log((1 − τS )ym ) +
Where

∑

m′ ∈S

zmm′

Pm
∑

) + ... + ϵmS

β0 m′ ∈S zmm′
+ ... + ϵmS .
(1 − τS )ym Pm

(33)

z is total transfers received from other municipalities. Now deﬁne
(1 − τS )ym Pm
· um (S)
β0
∑
≃
zmm′ + β0 log((1 − τS )ym ) + ... + ϵ̃mS ,

ũm (S, z) =

(34)

m′ ∈S

where ϵ̃mS = (1−τSβ)y0 m Pm ϵmS . Here, ũ approximates a standard transferable utility
cooperative game. This does not have a unique solution, but is covered by the Ray
and Vohra [1997] approach detailed above, and so will result in some sort of stable
35

The fact that distributional assumptions, which are arbitrary, do play a role in the estimates
is of course a concern. Currently, the idiosyncratic component of preferences for municipality m
regarding coalition S are assumed to be either uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic component of
preferences for municipality m′ regarding coalition S (in the RSR model) or completely correlated
(in the RP model). Allowing more ﬂexible correlation structures would be an obvious improvement,
but computational requirements would likely increase substantially.
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set. If random ϵ are drawn, then some idea of the eﬃciency gain of enforcing the
TU game, versus simply administering a ﬁxed incentive structure, can be obtained.
The exact transfers, however, depend on which stable coalition structure forms and
exactly how the surplus from each coalition is divided. For a given coalition S, the
possible utilities of the municipalities are determined by the possible values of x,
where the following conditions are satisﬁed:
∑
1.
m∈S xm = V (S), and
∑

xm ≥ V (S ′ ) ∀S ′ ⊂ S,
∑
where V (S) = m∈S ũ(S) is the value of coalition S.
It seems extremely unlikely that poor municipalities would have more bargaining
power than rich municipalities, and thus an “equitable” distribution of the surplus
seems to be the most optimistic scenario. A more pessimistic scenario would give
most of the bargaining power to richer municipalities, with a resulting increase in
post-merger inequality.
2.

m∈S ′

30

The nucleolus is used as a “best case” equitable division: it is the allocation which
maximizes over all potential deviating coalitions S ′ the smallest diﬀerence between
the amount allocated to the members of S ′ and that which they could obtain if they
deviated.36 To estimate the utility obtained in this case, 100 separate draws of ϵ
were performed for the eight smallest prefectures, and the resulting nucleoli were
averaged. This was compared to the no-transfer case, using the same 100 draws of
ϵ. The results are shown graphically in Figure 3. Municipalities with a per capita
income of less than ¥3,500,000 (about 18% of total population) are worse oﬀ, relative
to the no-transfers case, while richer municipalities are much better oﬀ. Thus, making
transfers feasible may or may not be optimal for the national government, depending
on its social welfare function. A worst-case scenario was also examined, where richer
municipalities are assumed to have all of the bargaining power, and thus as much
surplus as possible is transferred to the richest municipality, and then the next richest.
The results are very similar to those shown in Figure 3, although the regressive nature
of the transfers is slightly more pronounced.

3.6

Counterfactual simulations: Incentives to merge

If transfers between players are disallowed or otherwise impossible, but there is a
social planner that can provide incentives for coalition formation, then at least in the
two player case, the social planner should oﬀer such incentives:
Example 3. In the setup described in Example 1, if ϵ1 and ϵ2 are random variables
with density f , then before the ϵ are known, ∃τ, δ > 0 such that both players would be
in favour of a social planner oﬀering an incentive δ for coalition formation:
ũi ({1}) = ui ({1}) − τ
ũi ({1, 2}) = ũi ({1}) + ϵi + δ
E[1(ũ1 ({1, 2}) > ũ1 ({1})) · 1(ũ2 ({1, 2}) > ũ2 ({2})) · δ] = τ

(35)

More speciﬁcally, x is determined by argmin maxS ′ ⊂S E(S ′ ), where E(S ′ ) is the excess of coalix
∑
tion S ′ : E(S ′ ) = V (S ′ )− m∈S ′ xm . Note that if S is part of a stable partition, E(S ′ ) < 0 ∀S ′ ⊂ S.
There may be more than one x that leads to the same maximum above, but by continuing to minimize excesses lexicographically, a unique value of x is obtained.
36
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Ex ante, both players are in favour of this incentive being oﬀered because
(36)

E[ui ] = E[ui ({i})]

+ E[1(u1 ({1, 2}) > u1 ({1})) · 1(u2 ({1, 2}) > u2 ({2})) · (ui ({1, 2}) − ui ({i}))]
and thus
∂E[ui ]
|δ=0 = f (0)(E[max(ui ({1, 2}), ui ({i}))] − ui ({i})) > 0
∂δ

(37)

Intuitively, the gains from the incentive are ﬁrst order, occurring whenever one
player is almost indiﬀerent between forming the {1,2} coalition or not, and the other
player is very much in favour. The losses, on the other hand, are second order: when
both players are almost indiﬀerent, the incentive results in a {1,2} coalition now
forming when it wouldn’t have previously. In a game with more than two players,
however, any new coalition that forms due to this sort of incentive might displace an
existing non-singleton coalition, thus changing the set of stable coalition structures.
This is an additional cost of oﬀering the incentive, and any general theorem regarding
the eﬃciency of oﬀering incentives to form (non-singleton) coalitions would have to
have restrictions to ensure that the cost of such a disruption of existing coalitions is
not too high. The deﬁnition of “too high” in this case would depend on the social
welfare function used, but a simulation shows that welfare improving policies do exist
for reasonable social welfare functions.
In particular, suppose that the national government oﬀered an additional, budget
balanced incentive for certain municipalities to merge. The targeted municipalities
should be those that are most likely to be opposed to mergers that would beneﬁt
other municipalities, and the most likely municipalities to fall into that category are
richer municipalities. Consider the policy that oﬀered a transfer equivalent to 0.3%
of income, to residents of richer municipalities that participated in a merger, where a
“richer” municipality is deﬁned as one that had income per capita above the average
for the merger that they are participating in. This transfer would be paid for by an
increase in the income tax on everyone.
To determine the eﬀects of such a policy, stable partitions are simulated under
both the actual and the proposed alternative policies.37 The diﬀerence between the
37

These partitions are produced by generating random coarsenings of an all-singleton partition
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actual and alternative policies are shown in Figure 4.38 In addition to increasing
utility overall, the increase is the same for poorer and richer municipalities. This
is in contrast to the case with negotiated transfers, where poorer municipalities saw
decreased utility. For some set of inequality-averse social welfare functions, a social
planner might choose not to allow municipalities to negotiate transfers, but might
instead set a ﬁxed incentive scheme, one that rewarded desirable municipalities for
merging with their neighbours. Such an incentive scheme, however, suﬀers from the
problem that it appears to be regressive, in that it taxes everyone in order to make
transfers to the rich, and thus might be infeasible for political reasons.
and then drawing from this set of partitions after all the duplicates have been removed. This is
a consistent method of drawing a sample of stable partitions with uniform selection probability,
although it is biased (i.e. the probability of selection is not uniform) when the random coarsenings
drawn do not enumerate all the stable partitions. The degree of bias depends on the number
of random coarsenings drawn, but this bias does not appear to be important, since changing the
number of random coarsenings generated does not change the results.
38
The regression line shown is weighted by municipal population.
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4 Conclusion
This paper estimated the parameters determining preferences in a cooperative form
political coalition formation game, using two diﬀerent sets of assumptions and deﬁnitions of the solution set. The results obtained via the RSR approach are consistent
with intuition, while some coeﬃcient estimates obtained via the RP approach are
implausible. This diﬀerence is due mainly to the fact that preferences over coalitions
diﬀer by player, and this can be incorporated within the RSR approach. The parameters estimated via the RSR approach are used to examine potential alternative
national government policies. Counterfactual simulations suggest that an alternative
incentive scheme that rewarded relatively rich municipalities for merging would have
resulted in welfare improvements under most reasonable social welfare functions. Allowing transfers to be negotiated between municipalities may or may not be superior,
depending on the national government’s aversion to inequality and the bargaining
power of the various municipalities. The latter is likely unknown to the national
government, and thus even if transfers between municipalities could be enforced, it
may not be beneﬁcial for the national government to do so.39 At least as important
as the implications to government policy, however, is the methodology developed.
A coalition formation game without transfers accurately describes many real-world
phenomena, but it is rarely estimated in the empirical literature. As the price of
computing power decreases, however, the number of uses of this sort of model that
are feasible should increase. Although the game presented in this paper could be
estimated only because the geographical nature of the data permitted a large number
of possible coalitions to be discarded, such restrictions are less likely to be necessary
in the future. The results given above, then, are hopefully only an early indication of
the applications of this type of coalition formation model.

39

One possibility that was not considered in this paper is that of a tax on negotiated transfers.
In the simplest price control model, a tax redistributed to the consumer should be able to mimic a
price control, but with the assurance that the consumers with the highest willingness to pay obtain
the good. To the extent that the inability to make transfers is like a price control at zero, then, it
could be that the optimal policy for the government – rather than specifying a ﬁxed incentive scheme
to encourage rich municipalities to merge with their neighbours – would be to allow transfers, but
tax them heavily and redistribute the revenue obtained to the poorest municipalities. Overall, the
problem bears some resemblance to the classic rent control problem.
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A

Proofs

A.1

Proof of Theorem 1

Let S be the set of all potential coalitions. The unique stable partition can be
constructed as follows:
0. Let k = 0, π 0 = ∅, and S 0 = S .
k
k
1. Find Smax
such that ∀S ∈ S k , u(S) < u(Smax
).
k
k
2. Set π k+1 = π k ∪ {Smax
} and S k+1 = {S|S ∈ S k , S ∩ Smax
= ∅}.

3. If S k+1 ̸= ∅, repeat from 1.

A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
(existence). By construction, Π∗ is internally stable. Now take some π ∈
/ Π∗ . Then
∃{π1 , . . . , πm } ⊂ Π such that π → π1 → · · · → πm and either πm ∈ Π∗ or there is a
cycle with πm = πl for some l < m. If there is such a cycle, then it must contain both
mergers and dissolutions. Suppose that πk ↗S πk+1 , and let S1+ ⊂ S be the set of
agents that strictly prefer πk+1 to πk . If πk+1 ↗ πk+2 then S2+ ⊃ S1+ since no agent
can be made worse oﬀ by a merger. If πk+1 ↘S ′ πk+2 then S2+ = (S1+ \ R) ∪ P where
R is some subset of the residual, and P ̸= ∅ is some subset of the perpetrators, and
+
(R ∪ P ) ⊂ S ′ . Since Sm−l+1
= ∅, at some point the agents in S2+ must be made worse
oﬀ. This can only happen via reﬁnements, and only if there is a residual smaller than
S2+ . The latter, though, implies that some subset of S2+ cannot be made worse oﬀ,
and thus S + can never be empty. Thus a cycle cannot exist, and πm ∈ Π∗ .
(uniqueness). Suppose that Π∗∗ is also a stable set with respect to (Π, ↠). Consider
the bipartite directed graph deﬁned by ↠ with Π∗∗ \ Π∗ and Π∗ \ Π∗∗ as the two sets
of nodes. Every node must have in-degree of at least one, but there can be no cycles.
The only such graph is empty, and thus Π∗∗ = Π∗ .40
(PO element). Let ΠPO ⊂ Π be the set of Pareto optimal partitions, and ⇝ the
Pareto dominance operator. Suppose that ΠPO ∩ Π∗ = ∅ and consider the directed
graph deﬁned by ↠ ∪ ⇝ with ΠPO and Π∗ as two sets of nodes.
40

This does not imply that |Π∗ | = 1.
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B Data
Population data comes from the 1995 national census, which provides data at the
kilometer grid square level. Taxable income per capita is used as a proxy for income
per capita, with 1996 tax year data taken from the Asahi Shimbun Minryoku. The
list of mergers that actually occurred is from the Japan Geographic Data Center. To
construct the set of possible coalitions information on which municipalities share a
border is derived from shape ﬁles for 1995 boundaries from ESRI Japan. These ﬁles
are also used in conjunction with the census grid square data to calculate the location
of generalized median voters.41
Municipal ﬁnancial data is from the ’96-’97 and (for comparison) the ’06-’07 ﬁscal
year Shichōsonbetsu Kessan Jōkyō Shirabe, an oﬃcial national government report
of municipal ﬁnances.42 Because of the large transfers from the national treasury
to local governments, this data is handled quite carefully by oﬃcials in the central
ministries and is generally regarded as accurate, particularly the sections produced
by the central government itself. The isolated incidents of fraud reported generally
relate to variables reported by the municipalities, which are not used in this paper.
Table 3 gives summary statistics for this data. Units for population and surface
area are chosen to be close to the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs’ “reference municipality”.
There are no missing values in any of the ﬁnancial, population, or surface area data.
In the income data, four values are missing because one merger took place after the
data was collected but before it was published, and the old municipalities were not
reported. This variable, however, is only used in the preliminary ﬁnancial regressions
described below, and thus the data used in the main estimator does not have any
missing values.43
41
A precise calculation of the generalized median is computationally intensive, and infeasible given
the number of such values that need to be computed. A simple calculation of median latitude and
median longitude, however, yields a good approximation, and is used throughout the paper. Using
the mean voter, which is easy to calculate but not consistent with the model presented, yields similar
results.
42
This report also provides by municipality population data from the 1995 census, and surface
area data from a 1996 Geographical Survey Institute survey.
43
The 23 “special wards”, which cover roughly the area of pre-war Tokyo City, have powers similar
to cities but are excluded from the analysis because any enlargement of this sui generis area would
likely involve adding more wards, rather than changing the borders of existing ones. The twelve
“designated cities”, which have some powers normally reserved for prefectures, are omitted from
the preliminary ﬁnancial calculations because their additional responsibilities increase their required
spending, but they are included in the rest of the analysis as regular cities. The categories of “core
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The initial laws implementing the merger incentive scheme were passed in 1995,
and thus it would be optimal to use data from before this point. However, electronic
data availability improves around 1995, and most of the data used is from the ’95’97 period. Endogeneity problems seem unlikely, as most of the merger negotiations
and approvals occurred in the middle of the 1999-2010 window. In fact, the “Trinity” tax reforms were not even ﬁnalized until 2002, and this uncertainty provided
municipalities with an incentive to wait until after 2002 to conduct any mergers.
Consequently, using data from ’95-’97 should not cause diﬃculties. In particular, the
ﬁnancial data used is calculations by the national government, not actual spending
by municipalities, and thus is not vulnerable to “last minute” capital spending, where
a municipality planning on merging in 1999 might increase expenditures in its ’96-’97
budget.
c̃m (std. ﬁscal need, ¥)
POPULATION
AREA (sq. km.)
INCOME (per capita, ¥)
INCOME.INEQ
CITY (vs. town/vill.)

Units Mean
SD
100,000,000 54.64 88.87
100,000
0.31 0.65
100
1.13 1.33
100,000 30.99 4.45
coef. of var. 76.42 19.47
0.20 0.40

Table 3: Summary Statistics

city” and “special city” were created during the merger period, and therefore do not appear in the
data used.
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C

Japanese Local Public Finance

Post-war Japanese ﬁscal policy emphasized equalization between municipalities, and
established national standards for local government services.44 To ensure that every municipality had suﬃcient funds to oﬀer services above this minimum level, the
national government developed a complicated system of transfers, called the “Local
Allocation Tax”.45 The estimated cost c̃m for the provision of public services varies
from municipality to municipality, based on a formula developed by bureaucrats at
the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications. The 2009 version of the exposition of this formula (the Chihō Kōfuzei Seido Kaisetsu) consists of 600 pages of
Japanese legal text, 460 pages of formulae, and 240 pages of reference values; however,
as Figure 2 shows, c̃m can be approximated by the non-linear regression
c̃m (Pm ) = (γ0 + γ1 Pmθ )vm ,

(38)

where vm is a lognormal error term.46 The ﬁxed cost is thus γ0 , and the average
variable cost is γ1 Pmθ−1 . The values in Table 4 reﬂect the fact that the central ministries
believed that there were economies of scale in the production of public goods, and
thus per capita costs would be higher in municipalities with lower population: the
ﬁxed cost estimate is about ¥600 million for Columns II-V, and the marginal cost
(γ1 θPmθ−1 ) is about ¥200,000 per capita at a population of 1,000, but ¥100,000 per
44

One possible reason for this policy would be to correct a Flatters, Henderson, and Mieszkowski
[1974] “ﬁscal externality”; however, this requires the possibility of migration between municipalities,
which is not included in this paper. Dahlby and Wilson [1994] provide an alternative explanation
that is consistent with the model in this paper, where the goal of the transfer scheme is equalizing
the marginal cost of public funds across municipalities.
45
The slightly-confusing name is due to the fact that it is an allocation to local governments from
taxes collected by the national government.
46
The underprediction for large municipalities in Figure 2 is not necessarily evidence that Equation
38 is misspeciﬁed. Although “designated cities” have been removed, large cities that do not quite
meet the criteria to be so designated appear to have been allocated some additional responsibilities
on a more ad hoc basis. Because the underlying data that the Standard Fiscal Need calculations
are based on is not available, the amount allocated for these additional responsibilities is diﬃcult
to remove; however, Hayashi et al. [2010] show that the functional form used here matches cost
estimates generated by the dankai hosei adjustment coeﬃcient, which is the adjustment that creates
most of the per capita cost diﬀerence between municipalities with large and small populations. Weese
[2008] used a simpler speciﬁcation which matched the data in Figure 2 better for large municipalities:
this speciﬁcation was changed to that in Equation 38 after consulting with the Ministry of Internal
Aﬀairs oﬃcials responsible for the cost estimates.
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(Intercept)
θ
POPULATIONθ

I
9.57∗
(0.19)
0.90∗
(0.01)
137.19∗
(2.89)

AREA
INCOME
INCOME.INEQ

II
5.67∗
(0.12)
0.90∗
(0.00)
139.17∗
(3.04)
3.19∗
(0.10)
0.01
(0.02)
−0.07∗
(0.00)

III
6.15∗
(0.17)
0.87∗
(0.01)
143.01∗
(3.14)
2.73∗
(0.10)
0.09∗
(0.03)
−0.07∗
(0.01)

POPθ *INCOME
POPθ *INCOME.INEQ
PREFECTURE
CITY
N

N
N
3220

N
N
3216

Y
Y
3216

IV
V
5.94∗
6.16∗
(0.12)
(0.17)
∗
0.93
0.89∗
(0.01)
(0.01)
∗
146.76 145.21∗
(3.02)
(3.01)
3.13∗
2.58∗
(0.10)
(0.09)
−0.03
−0.00
(0.03)
(0.03)
∗
−0.03
−0.04∗
(0.01)
(0.01)
∗
1.02
2.11∗
(0.25)
(0.27)
−0.60∗ −0.81∗
(0.07)
(0.07)
N
Y
N
Y
3216
3216

Table 4: Dependent variable is Standard Fiscal Need (’96-’97)

capita at a population of 100,000.47 Taking into account both the ﬁxed cost and the
variable cost, the per capita cost of providing national minimum level public goods
in Ashiyasu village (population 567) would be roughly ¥1.5 million, compared with
roughly ¥100,000 in Sakai city (population 790,000).
With almost half of pre-merger municipalities having a population less than 10,000,
the decision to provide additional subsidies to smaller municipalities due to their size
was an expensive one. To attempt to reduce this ineﬃciency, in the 1990s the government implemented three policies designed to promote mergers.
First, the government substantially reduced transfers to the smallest municipalities
47

Column I is provided for reference, but as there are explicit expense categories dealing with land
administration (particularly forests and farmland), surface area is an obvious variable to include.
The results in Column I show that the null hypothesis that there are no economies of scope between
administering land and providing services to residents cannot be rejected: the diﬀerence in estimates
for γ1 and θ are both statistically insigniﬁcant between Column I and Column II. Comparisons with
Columns III-V do yield some statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences, but using parameter values from
these columns does not change the results in the following sections of the paper.
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(Intercept)
θ
POPULATIONθ
AREA
N

96-97
06-07
6.05∗
3.62∗
(0.23)
(0.23)
∗
0.89
0.87∗
(0.01)
(0.01)
∗
133.83 133.30∗
(5.31)
(8.55)
3.45∗
2.99∗
(0.19)
(0.24)
1129
1129

Table 5: Dependent variable is Standard Fiscal Need

by revising the Local Allocation Tax. This can be approximated as
Tmnew = max(c̃new
m (Pm ) − .75τ̄ Ym , 0)
new
c̃new
+ γ1 Pmθ )vm
m (Pm ) = (γ0

(39)
(40)

as shown in Table 5, with γ0new being about 40% lower than γ0 .48 The government
documents describing c̃new
make it obvious that this is not a re-estimate of costs
m
required to provide services, but rather an arbitrary decrease in transfers to small
municipalities: to compute a transfer based on c̃new
m , a set of per capita ceilings are
applied to the original components of c̃m and the result summed.
Second, municipalities that merged between 1999 and 2006 would not have their
transfers lowered due to the merger for at least ten years starting from the date of
the merger. That is,
∑
TSnew =
Tmnew
(41)
m∈S

would be provided for the decade following the merger.49 This incentive began to
48

The sample in Table 5 is restricted to those municipalities that did not participate in a merger
in order to have the same sample in both periods. Thus, the change in coeﬃcients represents
a change in national government transfer policy on the same group of municipalities during the
period in question. Inﬂation during this period was negligible. The diﬀerence in the POPULATION
coeﬃcient is statistically insigniﬁcant, and the diﬀerence in θ and the AREA coeﬃcient is marginally
statistically signiﬁcant (p roughly 0.05). The only economically signiﬁcant change is in the intercept,
indicating that the new policy eﬀectively involved a lump sum reduction compared to the old policy.
49
An intermediate amount between Equations 39 and 41 was oﬀered for years 11-15 following a
merger.
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be phased out in 2006, which motivated many municipalities to ﬁnalize mergers in
2005. By 2006 there were only 1,844 municipalities remaining, down from 3,255 at the
start of the merger period. A small number of mergers occurred during the phase-out
period, reducing the ﬁnal number of municipalities to 1,750 in 2010; for the purposes
of this paper, these mergers are treated as though they were ﬁnalized prior to 2006,
and implementation was simply delayed for exogenous reasons.50
A ﬁnal incentive for mergers was the Gappei Tokureisai, special subsidized bond
issues allowed for municipalities planning amalgamation.51 The value of these bonds
is calculated based on the subsidy oﬀered, using information from Ishihara [2000].
Municipalities are presumed to able to save in order to equalize the quality of public
services and the municipal tax rate between the decade immediately following the
merger, when incentives are provided, and following decades.

50

Explaining why a coalition would not form during the 1999-2005 period, but would under the
progressively less-advantageous policies in place in 2006-2010 would require adding elements to the
model, such as arrival of new information, that would substantially complicate the analysis. This
may be an interesting area for further work.
51
The oﬃcial explanation for these bonds was to eliminate any direct ﬁnancial cost of merging,
such as the construction of a new city hall. The merger bonds appeared to allow signiﬁcant capital
expenditures beyond the actual costs of amalgamation. Relative to the incentive provided by the
switch from c̃m to c̃new
in the calculation of transfers, these bonds have a very small eﬀect on
m
incentives to merge, and thus for simplicity the the bonds are treated entirely as an additional
incentive, with the direct ﬁnancial costs of merging ignored.

44

D

Random Draws of Partitions via Markov Chains

Let the state space X be the set of all partitions, and the transition matrix P be
deﬁned as follows:
Pxy = k if y can be created by either breaking apart one coalition in x into
subcoalitions, or merging coalitions in x together to create one new coalition,
Pxy = 0 ∀y ̸= x that do not meet the above condition,
∑
Pxx = 1 − y̸=x Pxy .
Since the state space is ﬁnite, this creates a valid transition matrix for suﬃciently
small k. P describes a reversible Markov chain, since a transition from x to y via
merging implies a possible transition from y to x via a breakup, and vice versa. The
chain is connected, since any partition can be obtained by ﬁrst breaking all coalitions down to singletons, and then constructing the desired partition. There is thus a
unique stationary distribution, since the chain satisﬁes the detailed balance condition
[Robert and Casella, 2004]. Moreover, the stationary distribution gives equal probability to each state, and thus draws from the stationary distribution are equivalent
to random draws from the set of all partitions. These draws can be performed using
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Unfortunately, the number of transitions that need to be considered is too large
to be computationally feasible. The number of ways a size ﬁfteen coalition could
be broken down into sub coalitions could be as high as a billion, and thus it is not
practical to enumerate all the possible transitions. Instead, the approach introduced
by Wernicke [2006] for the RAND-ESU algorithm will be used. Let p be a length
ﬁfteen vector of “cut probabilities” and let Q be a set of subcoalitions of S that form
∏
a partition of S. Then enumerate a member of Q with probability i∈{1,...,|S|} pi .
This gives each member of Q an equal probability of being enumerated, but allows
for a much smaller, randomly selected set to be considered. So long as this randomly
selected Q̃ is re-randomized each time a given state is reached, then the properties of
the above Markov chain are unchanged.
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